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Social Attitudes, Labor Law, and Union Organizing: Toward A New Economics of  
Union Density 
 
Abstract 
 
Much has been written about union wage bargaining. Much less has been written about union 
density, which has been viewed as simply the employment outcome under the wage bargain. 
This paper presents a new dynamic model of union density that exhibits multiple equilibria and 
path-dependency. The model builds upon Freeman (1998) who identified the importance of 
union spending on organizing and business spending on opposing unions. It emphasizes the 
demand for union representation which depends on wage bargaining outcomes, the state of labor 
law, and socio-economic factors impacting public attitudes to unions. The model is used to 
provide a narrative account of the historical evolution of union density in the U.S. and to identify 
factors important for its future evolution.  
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I Introduction 
 
       Much has been written about the theory of union wage bargaining, but relatively less 
research has been devoted to the density of union membership. Union density has tended to be 
viewed as simply the product of the employment outcome under the wage bargain. Whereas such 
an approach makes sense in times when the underlying state of union density is given, it makes 
much less sense when it comes to explaining the massive fluctuations that have occurred in the 
historical evolution of union density within the U.S. economy over the last hundred years. 
      Our approach seeks to remedy this weakness in the literature on the economics of unions. It 
presents a dynamic model of union density that exhibits the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
The model builds upon Freeman (1998) who identified the importance of union spending on 
organizing and business spending on union busting. However, it extends the analysis to include 
wage bargaining effects, as well as socio-economic factors such as the state of labor law and 
public attitudes about unions. The model is used to provide a narrative account of the historical 
evolution of union density in the U.S. economy. The paper closes by identifying a new 
microeconomic research agenda that grows out of an explicit focus on union density. 
II Shifting the focus: from union bargaining to union density 
       Economists have long had an interest in the economic effects of unions. However, a distinct 
feature of this interest has been a tendency to focus on firm-level impacts. This is typified by the 
monopoly union model in which the union is taken as an institutional given, and the union acts 
as a monopoly supplier of labor to the firm. Given this, wages and employment are determined 
by the union’s preferences over wages and employment given the firm’s labor demand curve.
                                                           
       There are many variants of this firm level approach to unions. Nash bargaining models 
(McDonald and Solow, 1981) have the firm and union jointly solving a program that maximizes 
the product of their respective objective functions subject to each realizing a minimum 
acceptable outcome. This co-operative bargaining model results in a Pareto efficient outcome 
(which is sensible from a classical maximization perspective), but enforcement of the bargain 
also requires counter-factually that unions have control over the level of employment. Non-
cooperative bargaining theory (Shaked and Sutton, 1981; Skillman, 1991; Skillman and Ryder, 
1993) provides another approach to union wage determination, with the outcome depending on 
bargaining costs to the firm and union, the magnitude of “outside” payoffs to the firm and union, 
and the rules governing the bargaining process.1 Though bargaining models break with the 
monopoly union model’s unrealistic claim that unions unilaterally set wages subject only to the 
constraint of firms’ labor demand schedules, they remain focused on firm level analysis and take 
the existence of the union as given. 
       Two sector union - non-union models broaden the scope of analysis and make way for a 
more realistic treatment of union density. McDonald and Solow (1985) present a model in which 
union wages are set by Nash bargaining and non-union wages are set competitively. Given this 
process of wage setting, union employment and density fluctuates with shifts in the union sector 
labor demand curve. Palley (1988) presents a two-sector model with a monopoly union. The 
innovation in that paper is that union preferences over wages and employment are endogenous 
and respond to the level of unemployment amongst union members. In this model, union 
membership includes both employed and unemployed members, and membership can expand in 
response to positive labor demand shocks in the unionized sector. Unemployed union members 
 
1 Outside payoffs represent the payoffs available to the parties if they break off bargaining with each other and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
may also drift out of the union sector in response to positive wage and employment shocks in the 
non-unionized sector, or in response to large negative wage and employment shocks in the 
unionized sector that lower union compensation premiums.  
      Such two sector models begin the process of explaining union density, but their approach is 
narrow. Thus, the union is taken as a given and density depends on the wage bargain and the 
state of sectoral labor demand. However, there is no mention of union organizing efforts or 
business opposition efforts. Nor is there any mention of worker attitudes toward unions. In 
effect, the two-sector union - non-union model can be thought of as providing a picture of union 
density at a historical moment in time conditional on a given state of unions as an institutional 
presence.  
       Although the two-sector model is an improvement on the single firm union model, such an 
approach is inadequate to the task of explaining the historical evolution of union density within 
the U.S. economy. Instead, accounting for unions as an institutional force requires a more 
fundamental analysis that emphasizes the social setting that girds the presence of unions. Such 
an analysis can be conceptualized in terms of the demand for and supply of union services, and 
the conditions governing demand and supply vary in accordance with historical circumstance. 
Hogler, Shulman and Weiler, (2003) have incorporated some of the social influences affecting 
union density across states, such as employer opposition, right to work laws and an aversion to 
collective action as measured by falling social capital. Although helpful in assessing the 
motivations of workers to unionize at a point in time, their cross-sectional approach does not 
fully capture the dynamic evolution of union density over time. Nevertheless, their analysis of 
union density across states indicates that preferences for unions matter, as does the ability of 
 
instead take up their best alternative opportunity. 
 unions to provide representation. Both features impact the dynamic evolution of union density. 
III A dynamic multiple-equilibria model of union density 
The history of union density within the U.S. economy is shown in Figure 1. Density was 
6.78% in 1900 and rose gradually to 13.24% in 1936. There then occurred a remarkable spurt 
with density rising to 34.23% in 1945. For the next twenty five years density declined slowly to 
23.36% in 1979, but thereafter the decline accelerated as union density fell to just 14.03% in 
1995 - approximately the same level as it was in the 1930s.  
<Figure 1 near here> 
How are we to account for this massive variation? Freeman (1998) presents a supply and 
demand model of union density that emphasizes union spending on organizing and business 
spending opposing organizing efforts. The model is given by 
(1) Ut = [1 - r]Ut-1  + NEWt                     0 < r < 1 
(2) NEWt = f(ORGt, OPPt)                      f1 > 0 for Ut-1 < U* and f1 < 0 for Ut-1 > U*, f2 < 0 
(3) ORGt = g(Ut-1)                             g1 > 0 for Ut-1 < U* and g1 < 0 for Ut-1 > U*
(4) OPPt= h(Ut-1)                               h1 > 0 
Where U = union density 
           r = attrition of unionized firms 
           NEW = new members 
           ORG = union spending on organizing 
           OPP = business spending on opposing organizing 
 
Equation (1) is the equation of motion determining the dynamic evolution of union density as a 
function of union attrition and new membership. Equation (2) determines new membership as a 
function of union organizing expenditures and business opposition to organizing expenditures. 
Equation (3) determines union spending as a function of union density. This function is concave 
and peaks at U*, reflecting diminishing returns to union spending on organizing. Finally, 
                                                           
equation (4) determines business expenditures opposing organizing as a strictly negative 
function of union density. 
The microeconomics of the system are embedded in equations (3) and (4). The logic of 
equation (3) is as follows. Initially, net marginal benefits to organizing are positive. At low 
levels of density, increases in density promote significantly higher wages from which union dues 
are payable. Moreover, unions can pick those workers that can be organized at least cost. 
However, as density increases, the wage gains from additional density decline and the cost of 
organizing marginal (more difficult to reach) workers rises, so that spending on organizing falls 
off. The logic to equation (4) is that as union density increases, unions become more powerful 
and more capable of disciplining firms.2 It therefore becomes more costly to oppose unions, and 
business opposition spending declines. 
Figure 2 shows the determination of equilibrium union density.3 The ray from the origin 
determines the decline in density arising from normal attrition of union jobs. The concave 
function determines the flow addition to density from new organizing. Initially it is increasing as 
the effects of spending on organizing outweigh the effects of spending against organizing. 
However, this function becomes negatively sloped as unions eventually cut back on spending 
owing to accelerating diminishing returns to the organizing dollar as union density increases. 
There are two equilibria. The lower equilibrium (marked A) is unstable, while the upper 
equilibrium (marked B) is stable. According to this model, increases in density result from 
 
2 We propose below that the achievement of high union density leads to an increased cost of employer opposition 
and also creates a path-dependent (or hysteresis) effect to union organizing. Path dependency arises because as union 
density increases, workers become more aware of the benefits of unionization, making it even more costly for firms 
to oppose unions.  
3 The solution shown in figure 2 is different from that shown in Freeman (1998) who shows unions and business as 
spending equal amounts on organizing and opposition in equilibrium. In fact, they spend different amounts, but the 
marginal impact of organizing and opposition spending on new membership is identical. 
 upward shifts of the new membership function, while decreases result from downward shifts. 
<Figure 2 near here> 
Freeman’s (1998) focus on the endogeneity of union density, the significance of union 
spending on organizing, and the significance of business spending on opposing unions are 
welcome innovations. Yet, at the same time the model appears incomplete. There is no reference 
to the demand for union membership (tastes), or the institutional and legal context in which 
organizing takes place. Nor is there any mention of the union wage premium, a strictly economic 
factor that is widely believed to be important in explaining why workers join unions, and why 
business opposes unions. 
From a historical perspective, there is little in the Freeman model that accounts for the 
astounding increase in union density between 1936 and 1944. Similarly, there seems little to 
explain the accelerated rate of decline in the 1970s and 1980s. Though capturing the conflict 
between unions and firms, the model does not provide an account of the factors impacting the 
new membership function. These factors may include conventional economic factors such as the 
union wage premium, as well as less conventional sociological and institutional factors such as 
public attitudes toward unions, changes in labor law and the effects of path dependency. 
Reflection upon the underlying factors influencing union density suggests reformulating 
the model to capture the “stock” demand for density, as well as focusing on the “flow” increment 
to density. This is done in the following model, which can be thought of as a dynamic model of 
the demand and supply for union density. The equations of the model are: 
(5) p = WUNION/WMKT 
 
(6) WUNION = W(U t-1,......) - DUES  >  WMKT       W1 > 0 
 
(7) WMKT = V(Ut-1,.....)                                        V1 > 0  
                                                           
 
(8) ORG = g(U t-1, DUES, LAW)                       g1 > 0 for Ut-1 < U* and g1 < 0 for Ut-1 > U*, g2 > 
0 
 
(9) OPP= h(W(U t-1,......)/WMKT, U t-1, LAW)            h1 > 0, h2 < 0, h3 < 0 
 
(10) D = D(p, ORG, OPP, ATT, TREAT,...)     D1 > 0, D2 > 0, D3 < 0, D4 > 0, D5 > 0, D6 < 0 
 
(11) ATT = U (Ut-1) 
 
(12) TREAT = t(Ut-1, LAW)                                  T1 > 0, T2 > 0  
  
(13) Ut-1 = Q(D - Ut-1)                                            Q1 > 0 
 
Where: 
 U= union density 
p = union wage premium ratio 
WUNION = union wage after payment of dues 
WMKT = market wage 
DUES = union dues per worker 
ORG = union spending on organizing 
OPP = business spending on opposing unions 
LAW = index of favorableness of labor law towards unions and organizing 
D = worker demand for unions (% of workers) 
ATT = index of favorableness of worker attitudes towards unions 
TREAT = worker treatment by employers 
 
The exogenous variables are DUES and LAW. 
 Equation (5) defines the union wage premium. Equation (6) determines the union wage 
net of dues payments, and it is assumed to be greater than the market wage. The union wage is a 
positive function of union density.4 The market wage is also a positive function of union density, 
as indicated in equation (7).5 This positive relation reflects the fact that non-union firms pay a 
premium to discourage formation of unions - and it is shown below that this practice reduces 
equilibrium union density. Finally, both the union and the market wage include payroll taxes, 
 
4 Equation (6) can be identified as a union “wage curve”. This is the union analog of the unemployment wage curve 
identified by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The latter has wages being a negative function of the unemployment 
rate. 
5 This practice is clearly evident in the U.S. auto industry where firms such as Honda, Toyota, BMW, and Mercedes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
health benefits, and pension benefits. These factors impact both the benefit to workers and the 
cost to employers of having unions. 
Equation (8) is the organizing function, which is an augmented version of equation (4) in 
the Freeman (1998) model. The ORG variable measures the resources devoted to organizing 
efforts by unions. As union density (U) increases, unions initially spend more. However, beyond 
a threshold density, organizing spending declines for two reasons. First, unions come to exercise 
significant control over the market so that there is little additional bargaining strength to be 
gained from additional membership. Second, those areas that remain non-unionized tend to be 
the most hostile and least tractable to organizing, discouraging unions from spending resources 
on them. Finally, the level of organizing expenditure is positively influenced by the level of dues 
and the favorableness of labor law. Dues provide unions with the resources to spend, while the 
favorableness of labor law positively impacts the membership yield from devoting additional 
dollars to organizing spending. 
Equation (9) is an augmented version of Freeman’s business opposition expenditure 
function, with the OPP variable measuring business spending on opposing unions.6 Spending 
against unions is positively impacted by the union wage premium, with business having a clear 
and increasing incentive to oppose unions as this premium rises. Second, business opposition 
spending is negatively related to union density. The competitive disadvantage the firm may face 
related to paying union wages is diminished at high union density levels, as there are fewer 
opportunities to compete on the basis of payroll costs when the majority of firms in the industry 
are unionized.  Finally, opposition spending is negatively influenced by the favorableness of 
 
all pay above local market wages as a means of blunting the union organizing efforts of the UAW.   
6 The OPP variable refers to employer opposition in its broadest sense. This includes opposition to union elections, 
and also includes efforts to bust unions by changing the location of employment. 
                                                           
labor laws towards unions since the impact of spending diminishes as labor law becomes more 
favorable.  
Equation (10) is the current demand for union membership, which determines the number 
of workers who actually join unions.7 Worker demand for unions depends positively on the 
union wage premium, union organizing spending, and worker attitudes toward unions and pro-
union labor laws. It depends negatively on business opposition spending. In their review of the 
literature on measures of public opinion of unions, Hogler, Shulman and Weiler (2003) claim 
that “culture” is an important dimension of workers propensity for unionization and should be 
taken into account in assessing membership trends. Attitudes can be thought of capturing this 
effect. The demand for union representation also depends negatively on firms’ treatment of 
workers.  
Equation (11) determines the quality of worker treatment. This depends positively on the 
extent of union density (a union threat effect), and positively on the extent of labor law 
protections for workers (i.e. a “just cause” employment contract). Equation (12) determines 
worker attitudes towards unions. The model proposes characterizing attitudes as subject to 
hysteresis, a representation that has hitherto been overlooked in models of union organizing. 
Hysteresis, in the general sense, refers to a system in which the reaction of the system to changes 
is dependent upon its past reactions. In other labor market applications, for example, hysteresis 
has been used to show that longer durations of unemployment will lead to higher unemployment 
levels because unemployment destroys human capital. In the current application, attitudes about 
 
7 It is worth distinguishing between “worker demand” for union representation which is expressed by actually 
joining unions, and “worker desires” for union representation which reflect wants. Surveys show that worker desire 
for unions greatly exceeds demand. However, in contemporary U.S. labor markets workers are unable to turn their 
wants for union representation into union membership due in large part to the weak state of labor law regarding 
protection against dismissal. 
                                                           
unions – which affect current demand for unions - depend on the past level of union density. The 
logic is that as fewer workers are engaged in union activities, less familiarity and goodwill is 
transferred to children, relatives, and younger workers. In other words, a young worker is likely 
to be more cognizant and favorably disposed to unions if a parent was a union member.8 Thus, 
low or high union density has reinforcing effects that become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Lastly, equation (13) is the equation of motion (in continuous time) governing union 
density, and density grows when demand for density exceeds actual density.   
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (5) yields an expression for the union 
wage premium as a function of union density 
(5') p = [W(Ut-1,......) - DUES]/V(Ut-1,.....)                                        
This function is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the wage premium to be a non-linear quasi-
concave function of union density. The logic is that union strength is relatively weak at low 
levels of density so that the premium is relatively small. As density grows, union bargaining 
strength increases dramatically and the union wage premium also increases rapidly. However, 
increased density beyond a certain level brings declining increments to bargaining strength, and 
non-union firms may also increase the market wage to discourage unionization. Consequently, 
the union wage premium function tapers off.9   
<Figure 3 near here> 
Figure 4 shows the graphical analogue of the full model. The demand for union density 
function has the same non-linear S-shape as the wage premium function because the latter is 
nested within it. The reduced form demand schedule is given by 
 
8 In a sense, there is a form of endogeneity of preferences toward unions. 
9 The union wage function can be thought of as embodying conventional microeconomic bargaining concerns found 
in the theoretical literature on union bargaining. 
 (10) D = D ([W(Ut-1,......) - DUES]/V(Ut-1,.....), g(Ut-1, DUES, LAW), 
                                              h(W(Ut-1,......)/V(Ut-1,.....), Ut-1, LAW), ATT(Ut-1), t(Ut-1, LAW), ....) 
There are three possible equilibria. The outer two equilibria (marked A and C) are stable, while 
the inner equilibrium (marked B) is unstable. Equilibrium density increases when the demand 
function shifts up: it decreases when the demand function shifts down.  
<Figure 4 near here> 
IV Explaining the evolution of union density in the U.S. economy 
  The above model can be used to provide a narrative account of the historical evolution of 
union density within the U.S. economy. Figure 1 suggests that four distinct periods can be 
identified: 1880 - 1935, 1936 - 1958, 1959 - 1971, and 1972 - present. 
Period I: 1880 - 1935. 
The late 19th century saw the emergence of the American labor movement as a means to 
counterbalance the increased bargaining power of the capitalist in the wake of a massive 
consolidation of industry. The thrust of industrial consolidation in the late 1800s originated from 
technological development that rewarded large fixed costs and the capture of greater market 
share (Heilbroner and Singer, 1996). Technological advance over this period was prodigious, 
and can be categorized into four clusters: 1) electricity, light and consumer appliances; 2) 
combustion engines, transportation and industrial mechanization; 3) chemical engineering 
(petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, and metallurgy); 4) communications and entertainment 
(telephone, radio, movies, etc.). Implementation of the new technology was costly and required 
large profits. In order to pay down the large fixed costs of industrial technology, firms were 
increasingly faced with the choice of either engaging in cutthroat competition for more market 
share or price collusion through pools, trusts, and eventually, mergers. The consolidation that 
 followed this rapid technological discovery led Alfred Chandler (1977) to comment that, “the 
visible hand of management replaced the invisible hand of the market.” With fewer employers to 
choose from, and with final product prices taken out of competition, workers saw their real 
wages and working conditions deteriorate tremendously.   
Dramatic demographic changes to the labor force also created a drag on wages and 
working conditions. The Immigration Act of 1864 legalized the entry of cheap labor from 
Europe and China, and by 1870 a third of all manufacturing workers in the US were foreign-
born. Many immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were concentrated in the “dirty” 
industries -- by 1907, over four-fifths of the workers in Carnegie’s Allegheny plants were eastern 
Europeans (Heilbroner and Singer, 1999). This cosmopolitan workforce was a feature of most 
industrial towns in America. By 1880 immigrants comprised 90 percent of the population in New 
York, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee and Chicago. Immigrants typically worked for low wages 
under abject conditions and were difficult to unionize. Unions were initially reluctant to 
welcome foreigners into their union halls. Moreover, cultural and language barriers made it 
difficult for those organizers that eventually tried to embrace immigrants workers. Immigrants 
were much more diffident towards their employer than domestic workers as they were not 
familiar with their rights to organize and were more accepting of paternalistic employment 
relationships (Heilbroner and Singer, 1999). Moreover, opportunistic employers often played 
one group of ethnic immigrants against another in an attempt to lower wages. 
 In the midst of this change, a small portion of the workforce embraced the practice of 
collective bargaining as a way to take wages out of competition and to ameliorate the dangerous 
working conditions of the Industrial Revolution. Union density increased from 1.61% in 1880 to 
11.87% in 1904. This period can be viewed as one of convergence toward the low-density 
 equilibrium identified as point A in Figure 4 above. In the next twenty-one years union density 
remained roughly unchanged, being 12.79% in 1935. However, there were fluctuations around 
the equilibrium point reflecting changes in business opposition efforts and changes in the 
buoyancy of labor markets. The low mark was 8.94% in 1909; the high mark was 17.40% in 
1921, with this spurt being driven by America’s entry into World War I. 
The relatively low level of union density during this period begs the question of “why 
more workers were not unionizing in the face of such low wages, long hours, and unsafe 
working conditions?” The state of labor law goes a long way in explaining the barriers to 
unionization, but the culture and mentality of the time is also a factor. Prior to the New Deal 
legislation of the 1930s, there were few federal laws protecting workers’ right to organize.10 
Moreover, cultural attitudes militated against the growth of unions. Dramatic increases in labor 
productivity, output, profitability and scientific discovery, may also have encouraged hopes of 
upward economic mobility that generated greater short-term acceptance of wider inequality. 
Even the most impoverished workers were optimistic that it was just a matter of time before their 
“ship would come in.” This expectation of leaping from the working class to the leisure class, led 
Beard (1933, 395) to comment that, “there was a baton [and top hat] in every toolkit.” However, 
such optimism was dashed by the extreme experience of the Great Depression, which radicalized 
working class demands for economic stability. 
Period II: 1936 - 1958. 
The Great Depression changed worker beliefs about the nature of market economies and 
made workers in the post-depression era much more receptive to the need for collective 
bargaining. Beginning in the mid 1930s, there ensued a period of rapid growth in union density 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which jumped from 13.24% in 1936 to 34.23% in 1945. In the thirteen years thereafter, union 
density remained close to the top end of this range, being 32.01% in 1958. This sudden spurt was 
the result of a massive shift in the demand for union density, driven by a deep-seated suspicion 
of the free market’s capacity to provide adequate levels of employment and compensation. As 
shown in Figure 5, this shift freed the economy from the pull of the low-density equilibrium and 
made the high-density equilibrium the unique equilibrium. Absent the epochal events 
surrounding the Great Depression, it is possible that union density would have remained trapped 
in the low-density equilibrium.  
<Figure 5 near here> 
There are a number of factors that account for the shift. First, since unions were better 
able to protect their members’ wages, the union wage premium rose in the Depression because 
market wages fell. Second, there was a significant improvement in public attitudes towards 
unions, which were widely viewed as protecting working people against the abuses and 
inequalities of market economics. This shift is clearly visible in the art and literature of the 
period. “Labor” became a “cause” amongst artists, public intellectuals, and academics, as 
exemplified in Clifford Odets’ 1935 play “Waiting for Lefty.” Third, there was a significant 
change in labor law - itself the result of changed public attitudes. Beginning with the New Deal 
legislative efforts, the Federal government took the lead in tilting the legal scales in favor of the 
working class. The monumental changes in US labor law that followed fostered union security 
clauses, promoting dramatic growth of union density during this period. Many of Roosevelt’s 
legislative acts –such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)- extended protections to 
workers who were seeking more power in the employment bargaining process. Section 7(a) of 
 
10 The National Industrial Recovery Act, establishing a macroeconomic defense of the closed-shop arrangement and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the NIRA gave employees the “right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing.” Given that there was a rancorous debate at the time over whether 
company unions (versus trade unions) should be allowed to enter into closed shop arrangements, 
the NIRA also established the National Labor Board to determine whether or not those employee 
associations were in fact “freely chosen.”  
Robert Wagner’s opposition to company unions was that they failed to give workers 
adequate power. This objection coincided with the chief macroeconomic objective of the New 
Deal legislation - the establishment of sufficient bargaining power to effectively redistribute 
economic resources (Taussig, 1929). Wagner’s legislation offered workers the right to choose 
exclusive representation with an independent (non-employer) union and to request compulsory 
membership of all employees. The Wagner (or National Labor Relations) Act, passed in July 
1935, established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce workers’ rights to form 
unions and bargain collectively. Its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court in NLRB 
v. Jones and Laughlin (April 1937). The promotion of this “closed-shop” employment practice 
and the consequent growth in unionization serves as a powerful indicator of the importance of 
the legal climate for union density. 
Although, the favorable organizing conditions brought on by the Wagner Act were 
curtailed somewhat with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, union density continued 
increasing into the mid-1950s. Having reached a critical union density level, it became easier for 
unions to organize new members, since young workers were readily familiar with the objectives 
and accomplishments of the labor movement. Meanwhile, high union density levels raised the 
stakes for employers opposing collective bargaining arrangements.   
 
precedence for the Wagner Act, was not signed into law until 1933.  
 Period III: 1959 - 1979. 
The period 1959 – 1979 is marked by two important changes. First, there is the beginning 
of decline in overall union density. Second, it is marked by a surge in public sector union density 
that has ultimately changed the composition of union density. Whereas private sector union 
density was the engine of growth for union density in the previous two periods, throughout the 
1960s and 1970s union density in the private sector began to wane. In 1970, private sector union 
density stood at 29.1 percent, but it would fall to roughly half that size within 14 years (15.5 in 
1984). Conversely unionization in the public sector jumped from 10.5 percent in 1959 to 36.4 
percent in 1979.  
The decline of union density in the private sector coincides with a weakening in public 
support for unions that became manifest in the late 1970s. Since public opinion is particularly 
important in organizing new (or low density) sectors of the economy, it stands to reason that 
diminished public support for unions would be felt the hardest in private sector. Public approval 
of unions, at least to some degree, affects the success of both union organizing and strikes. 
Medoff (1984) has shown that there is a strong negative correlation between workers’ voting for 
representative in NLRB elections and their image of unions. He also suggests that the voting 
patterns of local, state and federal politicians are responsive to public opinion regarding unions. 
Finally, Medoff (1984) contends that companies are given more leeway to commit unfair labor 
practices when there is little sympathy for unions. The effects of the waning support for unions 
in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen in Figure 6, which shows growing union disapproval ratings 
corresponding to the low-points of the percent of union elections won by labor, as well as a 
slight reversal in recent years.  
 <Figure 6 near here> 
Much of the jump in public sector unionization can be explained by policy changes 
undertaken in the 1960s. In 1961, President Kennedy’s Labor-Management Relations 
Commission found that there was no overall personnel pattern from one agency to the next and 
that various agencies had adopted counterproductive arrangements when dealing with unions. 
John F. Kennedy then issued Executive Order 10988 in an effort to standardize the manner in 
which Executive branch agencies interacted with unions. The most unique feature of Executive 
Order 10998 was its establishment of tri-level membership recognition. If an employee 
association or labor union represented a majority of the employees in an agency (with at least 60 
percent of the employees voting), it was granted “exclusive recognition.” If it had between 10 
and 50 percent, the union received “formal recognition.” An association of less than 10 percent 
was granted “informal recognition.” This contrasts sharply with almost all other industrial 
relations laws in the United States where only exclusive recognition is allowed. Consequently, 
competing minority unions could and did exist in many federal agencies and union membership 
in the public sector grew rapidly in the years following. By 1970 the federal work force was 48 
percent unionized, revealing the importance of legal environment for union density.  
In 1969, President Nixon took steps to make the labor-management practices in the 
public sector more compatible with the private sector. Nixon issued his own Executive Order 
(E.O. 11491), which contained a stronger duty to "meet and confer in good faith,” and also 
contained a "killer" management rights clause that restricted the scope of bargaining 
considerably. It also ended the three-level recognition arrangement and replaced it with 
exclusive recognition only. The result was that the minority unions disappeared but larger unions 
 continued to grow. By 1978, about 60 percent of federal workers were unionized—
approximately the same union density as today.  
In addition to federal organizing regulations, each of the 50 states has some sort of 
collective bargaining law governing state employees. In all but 10 states the right of public 
sector employees to strike is greatly restricted. These legal complexities and outright strike 
restrictions raise additional issues for understanding public sector union density. However, the 
model we propose is still applicable, though it may require the addition of political variables.  
Overall, the period 1959 - 1979 witnessed a slow steady erosion of total union density 
from 31.01% to 23.36%, which would have been much more drastic absent the surge in public 
sector unionization. This period can be identified with a slow steady downward drift of the 
density demand function, as shown in figure 7. Although the economy remained within the field 
of attraction of the high equilibrium point, the lower level of absolute union density (along the 
horizontal axis) lowered the cost of employer opposition activities. This created an incentive for 
employers to raise their opposition. Moreover, as density fell, path-dependency effects began to 
tilt in favor of employers.  
<Figure 7 near here> 
The reasons for this shift are multiple. One element was a gradual weakening of public 
support for unions, which came to be more identified with the narrower interests of their 
members. A lack of public support for unions diminishes the returns to organizing efforts, while 
reducing the costs of opposition for employers. The shift in attitude was likely fostered by the 
Cold War, which contributed to a mentality that was inimical to collective action as a means of 
dealing with economic problems. Indeed, the shift to narrow industrial unionism away from 
                                                           
broader social unionism may itself have been prompted by the Cold War as unions sought to 
distance themselves from possible charges of Communism. Finally, the prosperity of the 1950s 
relative to the Depression era may have contributed to a belief that Keynesianism had 
permanently solved earlier economic difficulties. Keynesian fiscal policy, rather than unions, 
therefore came to be seen as the principal solution to the inadequacy and instability of aggregate 
demand that often afflicts market economies.11
Coupled with deteriorating public opinions about unions, changes in labor law began to 
swing strongly in favor of business. A critical piece of the Taft-Hartley (1947) legislation was 
section 14b, which allowed states to pass so-called “right to work” laws. Right to work laws 
reduce union security by prohibiting forced union dues - thereby allowing workers covered by 
union contracts to enjoy union-negotiated benefits but to “free-ride” when it comes to the paying 
of dues. Most estimates have concluded that long-term union density is reduced by between 5 to 
8 percent after the passage of a state right to work bill (See Moore, 1998). Section 14b unleashed 
a huge free-rider problem and undermined the incentive to join unions. Taft Hartley also 
undermined the power of many unions to exercise leverage in strikes. Unions were prohibited 
from engaging in secondary strike action, and this gradually undercut their ability to exert 
pressure on a firm’s customer base, thereby enormously weakening their leverage.12 Unions were 
also made financially liable for damages resulting from illegal secondary actions and wildcat 
strikes. Lastly, on the organizing front, the Taft-Hartley removed the NLRB’s discretion to 
 
11 These causes of change in public attitudes are discussed in Palley (1998a, p.31 - 8). 
12 In traditional labor disputes, unions were viewed as having potential power over both the supply of output and the 
demand for that output as other unionized workers displayed their solidarity for the cause. Subsequent to the 
secondary (or unified) strike restrictions of Taft-Hartley, unions were only left with the power to impact industrial 
supply to the extent that they could disrupt local production. The loss of the power of secondary action has become 
even more critical in today’s globalized economy, which is characterized by multinational production and sub-
contracting. 
 recognize unions on the basis of card check by prospective members. Instead, employers were 
given an automatic right to demand an NLRB recognition election, thereby opening the flood 
gates for the type of pre-election intimidation spending by business that is so visible today 
(Freeman and Kleiner, 1990: Friedman and Prosten, 1993). 
Period IV: 1980 - present. 
A final period can be identified from 1980 to the present. At the beginning of the 1980s 
the decline in union density began to accelerate, falling to 14.03% in 1995.  This acceleration 
suggests that the economy crossed a threshold, moving from the pull of a high-density 
equilibrium to that of a low-density equilibrium. The shift to more pro-business Republican 
government and the liberalization of international trade were two critical factors. These two 
developments are captured in Figure 7 which shows a relatively large downward shift of the 
union density schedule in the early 1980s. The event that is most emblematic of the environment 
facing unions during this time period was Ronald Reagan’s highly-publicized breaking of the 
Professional Air Traffic Controller’s Organization (PATCO) strike and the rapid dismantling of 
the union. Reagan also changed the complexion of the National Labor Relations Board – the 
agency legally mandated to protect organizing rights - by appointing anti-labor members. The 
symbolism was heightened after Reagan’s 1984 reelection when the administration tried to hire 
non-union entertainers for the inauguration celebration (Goldfield, 1987).  
Rapid globalization of production has been another salient feature of the economy during 
this period. The growth of international trade can be likened to the influx of immigrant workers 
during the late 19th century, effectively placing domestic workers in direct competition with 
foreign workers. Many recent studies have identified a close relationship between greater 
international trade and the recalcitrant wage growth of US workers. Paul Krugman (1995) 
                                                           
attributes 10 percent of the increase in U.S wage inequality in the 1970s and 1980s to trade, 
whereas Cline (1997) attributes 37 percent of the increase to trade.13 Yet, these two studies 
ignore the indirect effects on wages and wage inequality of trade-induced decreases in union 
density. Palley (1999) examines overall income inequality using the U.S. family income gini 
coefficient, and reports that 24 percent of the increase in inequality between 1980 and 1997 is 
directly attributable to increased openness, and this rises to 34% if the negative effect of trade on 
union density is taken into account. 
Globalization can be thought of as exerting downward wage pressure in domestic labor 
markets. It does this by increasing the bargaining power of business relative to labor by giving 
business improved exit options. To the extent that globalization reduces the union wage 
premium, it will tend to reduce demand for unions and lower equilibrium density. The 
hemorrhaging of the heavily unionized manufacturing sector over the last five years, suggests 
that international wage competition has disproportionately impacted union workers. The 
phenomenon has prompted Joseph Stiglitz (1997) to observe that, “For all intents and purposes, 
unions no longer play a role in the wage negotiations of the sector that was once their bastion of 
strength.”14 Since 1995 union density has been roughly constant (between 12 to 14 percent), 
suggesting that it may have stabilized at a new low-density equilibrium. 
V Looking to the future: strategic trade-offs 
The above model offers some interesting insights into the difficulties unions face 
rebuilding density. At this stage union density may be trapped in the low-density equilibrium. A 
successful rebound will require shifting the demand for density schedule up, but gains to density 
 
13 Cited in Baker and Weisbrot (2001). 
14 It is possible for globalization to exert equal downward pressure on both union and non-union wages, leaving the 
union wage premium and the demand for union density unchanged. In this event, globalization can be neutral with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
initially stand to be marginal. Re-creating the high-density equilibrium will involve a large 
upward shift of the demand function such that the high-density equilibrium becomes the global 
attractor. Given the influence of path-dependency on union density via attitudes, a robust 
rebound in union membership is unlikely without some exogenous change - such as labor law 
reform - that generates a large upward shift in union demand. However, the likelihood of 
substantial reform in the current political landscape is low.  Labor law is in part a reflection of 
the general acceptance of unions, and changing it will require a popular movement in defense of 
collective bargaining. 
Public attitudes toward unions thus represent a critical variable in determining the 
demand for unions, highlighting the importance of unions building broad political coalitions. 
However, this approach can also cause tensions, as illustrated by consideration of the minimum 
wage. Suppose public attitudes towards unions are a positive function of union support of the 
minimum wage and other programs benefiting the economically disadvantaged. Union support 
for such programs can be a double-edged sword as higher minimum wages have a positive 
impact on the market wage, which lowers the union wage premium and diminishes demand for 
unions. Palley (1998b) reports that the minimum wage positively impacts wages of the bottom 
30% of female workers, and positively impacts wages of the bottom 20% of male workers. In 
this case, the demand for union density becomes 
(10') D = D([W(Ut-1,...)-DUES]/V(Ut-1, WMIN,...), g(Ut-1, DUES, LAW), 
                                                       h(W(Ut-1,...)/V(Ut-1, WMIN, LAW), ATT(WMIN,...)) 
Raising the minimum wage (like most worker solidarity legislation) then has an ambiguous 
impact on demand for union representation. It improves public attitudes towards unions, which 
 
respect to union density. 
 raises demand for union representation; and it also lowers business opposition spending by 
lowering the union wage premium. Balanced against this, minimum wage hikes raise the market 
wage and lower the union wage premium, which directly reduces demand for union 
representation. If the latter impact dominates, a higher minimum wage could reduce demand for 
unions by reducing the wage gain from joining unions. 
The possibility that minimum wage increases can undermine demand for union density 
raises an even deeper political conundrum. Trade unions, today and historically, have been a 
major political force pushing for social welfare legislation that ameliorates the callousness and 
inequities of market-based economies. Yet, to the extent that they succeed and the legislation is 
effective, they risk undermining the demand for union density. It bears mention that the 
achievement of a higher minimum wage is a one-time adjustment with no permanent process put 
in place to protect the purchasing power and bargaining position of the workers. Unionization, 
however, is an on-going evolutionary relationship – the primary purpose being the provision of a 
countervailing force against the employer’s wage-setting power.  
Another trade-off concerns the setting of membership dues. Higher union dues provide 
the resources needed to finance effective organizing, and this raises demand. At the same time, 
they lower the union wage premium, which reduces demand. This dilemma is particularly 
problematic when it comes to organizing low-wage labor markets where industry conditions may 
leave relatively less space for unions to force up the union wage. If industry conditions compel 
dues to be low, this may make it cost-ineffective to organize and administer unions in particular 
industries beyond a certain level of union density. 
Such reasoning suggests that union density in advanced capitalist societies may be 
subject to long wave cycles that are driven by changing socioeconomic conditions. The process 
 might work as follows. Periods of union weakness contribute to business leaders seeking to 
restore the opportunism of the market by repealing ameliorative social welfare legislation. This 
creates conditions of widespread hardship that in turn contribute to a social backlash that fuels 
public support for unions. The shift in public attitudes then begins the process of shifting the 
economy back toward the high-density equilibrium. In tandem with this shift, there begins a new 
cycle of union sponsored progressive social welfare legislation that diminishes both direct 
demand for and public support of unions by reducing economic inequities and hardship. Support 
for unions may also begin to wane to the extent that they are successful in solving wage and 
income distribution problems, and the public comes to deem unions as “no longer necessary.” At 
this stage, eroding public support triggers a long decline back to the low-density equilibrium. 
The model highlights the significance of the union wage premium in determining demand 
for density. New members want unions to deliver economic benefits. In this regard unions face a 
further difficulty in that the union wage premium has been steadily falling since the early 1980s. 
A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics report shows that from 1984 to 1990 non-union worker 
wages and salaries rose faster than those of union workers (Foster, 2000). Union workers 
recovered the edge from 1992 - 94, since then, however, non-union wages and salaries have 
again been rising faster. 
Qualifying this is the fact that the impact of the union wage premium may work in more 
complicated ways. Thus, public attitudes may be negatively impacted by too large a wage 
premium, perhaps reflecting a belief that union workers are being unfairly over-paid. In this 
case, a falling union wage premium could translate into greater public support that actually 
increases demand for density. Beyond this, there is the more fundamental point that the premium 
is a ratio of wage levels. It can be viewed either as the union wage being too high or the market 
 wage being too low. If the public comes to see the issue as an inadequate market wage, this 
would blunt charges that a high union premium reflects over-payment and would build support 
for both higher union wages and higher market wages. 
The ratio of the gross union wage to the market wage is an especially important variable 
influencing business opposition spending. This has salient public policy consequences in the 
U.S. where health and pension benefits are bargained for. These bargained benefits push up the 
cost of union workers and give firms a stronger incentive to oppose unions. Mishel, Bernstein 
and Schmitt (1999) report that in 1997 the union compensation premium in the U.S. was $6.20 or 
35.9%, and $2.05 of this was attributable to superior insurance and pension benefits. This 
contrasts with European social democracies where benefits are provided by the state, which may 
explain why European business is more accepting of unions. This suggests that if employer 
opposition is the principal obstacle to union density then an important union political priority 
should be to change the current system from one of bargained health benefits to one of state 
provided benefits. 
VI Conclusion: a new agenda for research on unions 
This paper has developed a new economic model of union density. The model departs 
from the existing theoretical literature by focusing on the demand for union density and 
introducing the influence of public attitudes towards unions, union involvement in labor and 
social legislation and the path-dependent effects associated with varying union density. In doing 
so, it extends the scope of analysis beyond a narrow union - firm focus. Unions are institutions 
that exist within society, and their ability to thrive depends heavily on labor law and public 
support. This implicitly brings the analysis of unions into the fold of “law and economics.” Laws 
governing employer rights of dismissal, employee rights to form unions, and employee rights to 
 obtain redress in the event of unfair dismissal are critical. Legal and administrative rules and 
restrictions matter enormously, and this is clearly illustrated by comparison of discharge rates for 
organizing in industries governed by the National Labor Relations Act versus the Railway Labor 
Act (Morris, 1998).  
For economists, the suggested approach to understanding union density opens a new 
economic research agenda that explores how different rules and remedies might impact union 
density, what determines the effectiveness of union organizing strategies, and what determines 
the extent and effectiveness of employer opposition to unions. It also suggests research into what 
type of representation people want at work, and what types of institution have the best prospects 
of delivering those demands. This is important as it can show how unions need to develop and 
evolve in response to changing employment relations and worker attitudes. Finally, the 
suggested approach links the economics of unions with broader sociological studies of unions in 
which union density is placed within an institutional context. In his comparative cross-national 
study of union density, for example, Western (1997) identifies three crucial institutional 
conditions: strong working class political parties, centralized collective bargaining, and union-
run unemployment insurance. Our model has shown that many of these institutional conditions 
can be analyzed in terms of their impact on the supply and demand for union services, helping 
understand union density in particular countries – even one as idiosyncratic as the United States.  
Figure 2. The Determination of Equilibrium Union Density in the 
Freeman (1998) Model.  
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Figure 6. Public Support for Unions and Election Win Rates
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